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Abstract
Market-based conservation instruments, such as payments, auctions or tradable permits, are environmental policies that
create financial incentives for landowners to engage in voluntary conservation on their land. But what if ecological
processes operate across property boundaries and land use decisions on one property influence ecosystem functions on
neighboring sites? This paper examines how to account for such spatial externalities when designing market-based
conservation instruments. We use an agent-based model to analyze different spatial metrics and their implications on
land use decisions in a dynamic cost environment. The model contains a number of alternative submodels which differ
in incentive design and social interactions of agents, the latter including coordinating as well as cooperating behavior of
agents. We find that incentive design and social interactions have a strong influence on the spatial allocation and the
costs of the conservation market.
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agent-based models
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1. Introduction
What is the value of nature? Markets for biodiversity
conservation are based on the possibility of rating conser-
vation services (e.g. the provision of an acre of rainforest)
in terms of their contribution to conservation goals. A
problem that arises when deciding on rating systems is
that typical ecological processes operate on a much larger
scale than that of typical landowner properties. Therefore,
local land use decisions are likely to affect the ecological
value of neighboring land. This paper deals with the prob-
lem of incorporating such spatial interactions into market-
based conservation instruments.
Market-based instruments have become increasingly pop-
ular in recent years (Jack et al., 2008), however, they are
still a relative new tool for conservation policy. Tradition-
ally, conservation was dominated by regulation and plan-
ning approaches which emerged as a response to problems
associated with the change and intensification of land use
during the last century. Of particular importance for the
effectiveness of top-down approaches such as regulations
and planning is the inclusion of both the monetary costs
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and the ecological benefits of conservation measures (Faith
andWalker, 1996; Ando et al., 1998; Margules and Pressey,
2000). This insight points to a practical problem of plan-
ning approaches: local costs are difficult or expensive to
estimate, and it is seldom in the interest of landowners to
report them honestly. Moreover, costs may change over
time. In these cases, market instruments provide an al-
ternative to planning approaches because they are able to
efficiently allocate conservation efforts to the spatial distri-
bution of conservation costs, even when cost information
is only available to landowners and not to the regulating
authorities (information asymmetry).
The common principle of market-based instruments is to
introduce a metric that rates the value of conservation
measures in terms of their contribution to conservation
goals. This metric translates conservation measures into
one currency (commodification) and thereby makes con-
servation comparable and tradable based on this currency
(Salzman and Ruhl, 2000; Salzman, 2005). In practice,
different names are used for this currency. We will use
the term "credits" throughout this paper, and say that
the metric measures the amount of conservation provided
by a site in credits. Demand for credits may be created
by different mechanisms, e.g. payments (Wunder, 2007;
Drechsler et al., 2007; Engel et al., 2008), auctions (Latacz-
Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort, 1998) or biodiversity
offset schemes (Panayotou, 1994; Chomitz, 2004). This
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demand for credits, together with the metric to measure
them, creates an incentive for conservation. In a sense, we
may view the process of trading credits as a policy-based
site selection algorithm (Faith et al., 2003): competition
among suppliers automatically extracts the sites that can
provide conservation measures at the lowest costs.
Yet, while markets may help to solve the problem of cost
information asymmetry between landowners and regula-
tors, the definition of an accurate measure of conserva-
tional value runs into problems when the ecological val-
ues of sites are dependent on each other. An apparent
solution is to incorporate spatial dependencies into mar-
ket values (Parkhurst et al., 2002). While this is generally
possible, it implies that conservation decisions may change
the market value of neighboring land. In the presence of
such spatial interactions, referred to in the literature as
externalities, spillovers or site synergies, markets may fail
to create an efficient spatial allocation of the traded good
(Mills, 1980). Moreover, ecological processes may operate
on a large range of spatial and temporal scales and show
complex dependencies, making the exact accounting for
ecological interactions potentially very difficult. Moilanen
(2005) discusses a case of interactions where already static
optimization is computationally hard. In such a case, it is
unlikely that market participants would find the optimal
allocation of conservation measures, particularly if they
are subject to external drivers such as changing conserva-
tion costs.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the functioning of sim-
ple spatial incentives in market-based conservation instru-
ments. We use an agent-based model to examine whether
simple spatial connectivity incentives operating on a local
scale can effectively influence the larger scale allocation of
conservation measures, and how design of the spatial in-
centives and social organization affect the emerging land-
scape structure.
2. Problem definition and modeling approach
The fact that sites may interact and influence the eco-
logical value of neighboring sites creates a number of is-
sues which make spatial incentives an interesting problem
for economics and conservation research. A number of im-
portant real-world processes create spatial interactions be-
tween sites. One example is habitat fragmentation, which
constitutes a major problem for biodiversity conservation
(Saunders et al., 1991; MA, 2005). The origin of this prob-
lem is that many species require to travel between habitat
patches in the landscape. When habitats are increasingly
isolated, e.g. through land use change, they may eventu-
ally be of very low value for biodiversity because species
can not reach them. Therefore, the ecological value of
a natural habitat generally increases when other natural
habitats are in the vicinity.
In this paper, we assume that there is a symmetric, pos-
itive interaction benefit between conserved sites. As dis-
cussed above, this is very likely to be the case in real-
world conservation problems. However, other cases such
as non-symmetric benefits (see Vuilleumier and Possing-
ham, 2006) or negative interactions could equally be tar-
geted with markets. The aim of this section is to clarify
the conceptual questions that arise from including spatial
incentives in market instruments, and to formulate more
precisely the questions we want to answer with the model.
2.1. Marginal and additive incentives
The first question relates to the difference between the
total and the local valuation of conservation measures. Let
us assume that we have a market instrument with spatial
incentives, and we have a metric U which measures the
ecological value of a landscape and includes spatial inter-
actions between sites. As an example, we may have two
sites which have, as isolated sites, an ecological value of
2 credits each. If each site benefits from the presence of
the other, the total ecological value of the two sites will be
higher than the sum of the single sites, which is 2 + 2 = 4
credits. Let us assume that the collective value U is 6
credits, consisting of the single values which amounted to 4
credits, and 2 additional credits originating from the pos-
itive interactions. What is the value of these connected
sites? One may assume that, as both sites are identical,
it should be 3 for each site. However, removing any of
the two connected sites would leave us with a single site
of value 2, suggesting that the value of the first site which
was removed was in fact 4. An illustration of this is given
in Fig. 1.
To give a more mathematical description of this, assume
that the metric measuring the credits awarded to a site as
follows
U =
∑
i
{(1−m) ·Ai + m · βi} . (1)
Here, the sum runs over all conserved sites, and each site
is evaluated according to its area Ai and its connectivity
βi, i.e. its connection and therefore its interactions with
neighboring sites. For now, we view βi as a generic mea-
sure of connectivity, but we will give a specific expression
in the model description. The parameter m, taking values
from 0 to 1, specifies the trade-off between areaAi and con-
nectivity βi. We call m the connectivity weight. If m = 0,
a connected site receives the same amount of credits as
an unconnected site. Increasing m, connectivity becomes
more important. If m = 1, only the connectivity of sites
is rewarded with credits. Despite its simplicity, this func-
tion essentially captures the trade-off between area and
connectivity, which is found to be very important for the
conservational value of sites in fragmented landscapes (e.g.
Frank and Wissel, 2002; Drechsler, 2009). The appropri-
ate value of m depends on the species under consideration.
For some systems, connectivity is more important, while
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others depend mostly on area.
Marginal incentives (1): The change of total ecologi-
cal value originating from the removal of one site is called
the marginal value bmar of this site. For our former exam-
ple, each of the two connected sites has a marginal value
of 4, because their removal would decrease the total value
U by 4. Assuming eq. 1, the marginal value of the i-th site
is given by
bmari = (1−m) ·Ai + 2 ·m · βi . (2)
The factor 2 in the second term originates from the fact
that not only the connectivity of the focal site is removed,
but also the connectivity of the sites it interacts with is de-
creased by the same value (symmetric benefits). Incentives
based on the marginal value we call "marginal incentives".
There are two important points to note about marginal
incentives. Firstly, if more than one site is changed, the
marginal values of the sites depend on the order of trad-
ing. Assuming a positive interaction between sites, there
is a first-mover disadvantage: the marginal value of the
first site created is less than the marginal value of the sec-
ond site, and the costs for the first site to be removed are
higher than for the second site (Fig. 1 ). Secondly, the
marginal value of two sites is generally not the sum of the
two sites’ marginal values. Marginal values do not add
up to the total value. These two properties have strong
implications for conservation policy. For using marginal
incentives, we have to make sure that the order of trad-
ing is known, i.e. that trading takes place sequentially.
Moreover, another problem arises when landowners want
to withdraw a site from the market, and this sites marginal
value has changed since creation because other sites have
been added in the vicinity. Marginal incentives require
that the costs for withdrawing such a site must be higher
than the benefits initially awarded for it (see Fig. 1 ). This
means that marginal incentives are difficult to use for short
term incentive mechanisms such as yearly flat rate pay-
ments. They are, however, very suitable for markets such
as tradable permits where both creation and destruction is
targeted, or markets with long-term contracts, where the
problem of habitat destruction does not arise.
Additive incentives (2): Another way to arrive at a sen-
sible local evaluation of sites is by simply dividing mutual
benefits equally among the involved sites (see Fig. 1). The
value that results from sharing the benefits is still higher
than the value of isolated sites, but it is generally lower
than the marginal value. For the case of eq. 1, equally
sharing the mutual benefits results in local values of
baddi ≡ (1−m) ·Ai +m · βi . (3)
We call these incentives additive incentives because their
sum adds up to the total value:∑
i
baddi = U . (4)
A
$=2
B
$=2
$=3 $=2/4 $=4/2$=3
Additive
Incentives
Marginal 
Incetives
1$ Benefit
 A to B 
1$ Benefit
 B to A 
Total Value = 6$ 
1st site 2nd site 
Figure 1: Two sites of equal size, A and B, are of mutual benefit to
each other. When isolated, each site has an ecological value of 2 each.
Connecting the two sites creates an additional value of 2, the results
of a benefit of 1 in each direction. Given additive incentives, each
landowner receives 3 credits, while under marginal incentives, the
first one to come would receive 2 credits, whilst the second receives 4
credits because his site adds all the mutual benefits and thus confers
a marginal value of 4 to the network. Yet, note that if both sites are
present, each site has a marginal value of 4. Therefore, the first site
to move would create a marginal damage of 4, while the damage of
removing the second site would only be 2, as indicated by the second
number.
Markets with additive spatial incentives have been sug-
gested, e.g. by Parkhurst et al. (2002) or Hartig and
Drechsler (2009), as a means to improve the spatial ag-
glomeration of conservation sites. Additive incentives have
the advantage that the order of creation or destruction has
no impact on the value of a particular site, and the value
of any number of sites is simply the sum of the values of
these sites. One drawback, however, is that a change of
conservation on one site may directly affect the ecologi-
cal value and therefore the credits awarded to neighboring
conserved sites. This might create acceptance problems
for real-world conservation schemes. Another issue is that
marginal values assign only a part of the costs and benefits
created by a land use change to its originator. This may
lead to efficiency losses. We show evidence for this in the
results.
2.2. Social Organization
If market incentives for conserving a site depend on
the neighboring sites, it is important for landowners to
know their neighbors’ intentions. We assume that agents
are always profit maximizing and myopic in the sense that
they base their decision on the most profitable action for
the next timestep without displaying strategic behavior.
Within this setting, we consider three behavioral submod-
els:
Null model (a): In the null model, agents observe the
present landscape configuration and decide based on the
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prospect of the future land configuration being the same
as the present one.
Coordination through cheap talk (b): We assume that
agents may communicate their future intentions. This can
be beneficial because it increases the accuracy of the esti-
mate about the upcoming land configuration. We under-
stand coordination as the communication of non-binding
information about the present state of the decision, often
called cheap talk (Farrell and Rabin, 1996). Experimen-
tal studies have shown that the possibility of coordination
by cheap talk leads to an increased probability of finding
cost-effective configurations (Parkhurst et al., 2002). Gen-
erally, cheap talk also includes the possibility of strategic
lies. This option is omitted in the simulation and hence
agents will always stick to the action they communicated
as long as their information does not change.
Cooperation (c): Further payoff improvements are pos-
sible if agents not only coordinate, but cooperate. Cooper-
ation means that conservation is provided if it is beneficial
for the group, even if this does not maximize the profits
of each individual. As marginal and additive incentives
differ only in how benefits are distributed to individuals,
but not in how many credits are rewarded in total, there
is no difference between them from the point of view of
cooperating agents. In a cooperating group, agents reveal
their true costs, the group chooses the best configuration
of sites, and the payoffs are distributed among the group
members according to their costs. It would be possible
that single individuals exploit such a system by commu-
nicating higher than the true costs to increase their share
from the group benefits. We do not consider this possi-
bility in the model, but we will address this issue in the
discussion.
For options a) and b), decisions are made individually,
while cooperating agents c) decide collectively. We will
later see that these structurally different decision processes
are also reflected in the resulting land use pattern. Table 1
summarizes the possible combinations of submodels and
their properties.
3. Model description
3.1. Overview and purpose
The aim of the model is to examine the effect of spatial
incentives and social organization on the emerging land-
scape structures and on the total cost of a conservation
market. The model is based on the models introduced
in Drechsler and Wätzold (2009) and Hartig and Drech-
sler (2009). It predicts the spatial allocation of conser-
vation sites emerging from agents’ decisions to conserve
their land or not. These decisions are driven by spatially
and temporally heterogeneous costs of conservation and
by the benefits of conservation, which depend on the cur-
rent market price and on the amount of conserved cells
in the neighborhood. This dependence on the state of
the neighboring cells resembles 2-dimensional spin mod-
els with local interactions which have been used to ana-
lyze phenomena of social interactions (Galam and Zucker,
2000; Sznajd-Weron and Sznajd, 2000; Holyst et al., 2000;
Schweitzer et al., 2002). It also exhibits similarities to the
Random Field Ising Model (Imry and Ma, 1975) and non-
equilibrium models such as Hausmann and Rujan (1997)
and Acharyya (1998). In the follwowing subsections, we
give an overview first of state variables and scales, and
then about the processes implemented in the model.
3.2. State variables and scales
The simulation is carried out on a 2-dimensional grid
with 50x50 grid cells (sites) and periodic boundary condi-
tions. Every grid cell xi is owned by a different landowner
(agent) and can be occupied with a habitat (σi = 1) or be
used for other purposes (σi = 0). Although the model may
be applied to any spatial and temporal scale, we think of
grid cells as being of the size of an average agricultural field
in Europe, and time steps being a year. The occupancy of
a grid cell results in conservation costs ci(t) which may be
different for each cell.
We assume that we have a market instrument which re-
wards a certain price P for each conservation credit pro-
duced by landowners. Conservation credits are calculated
according to the metric given in eq. 1, where the area Ai
was set to unity and is therefore omitted.
U =
N∑
i
σi {(1−m) + m · βi} (5)
As before, m weights the importance of connectivity βi
relative to area for the ecosystem function which is tar-
geted by the market. The connectivity metric βi, which
measures the interactions between patches, is chosen as
βi ≡ 1
8
∑
<j>i
σj (6)
where < j >i indicates all cells j which belong to the
8 cells xj in a Moore neighborhood of xi. The metric
is normalized to one and basically measures the fraction
of the 8 cells in the neighborhood of the focal cell which
are used for conservation. We assume a totally inelastic
demand
D = λ ·N (7)
for conservation credits, which should equal the supply U .
A list of all basic state variables and parameters is given in
Table 2. We define the average number of occupied sites
α ≡ 1
N
N∑
i=1
σi . (8)
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Label Submodel Decisions Time order Communication
(a.1) Null marginal
individually
dependent none(a.2) Null additive independent
(b.1) Coordination marginal dependent intentions(b.2) Coordination additive independent
(c) Cooperation Collectively independent full information
Table 1: Overview of alternative submodels for the spatial incentives and for agent behavior
Further, we define the average connectivity K of the oc-
cupied sites as
K ≡ 1
α ·N
N∑
i=1
σi · βi (9)
and total conservation costs C of a landscape configuration
as the sum of the costs of all conserved grid cells, divided
by the number of grid cells
C ≡ 1
N
N∑
i=1
σi · ci . (10)
3.3. Process overview and scheduling:
At each time step, costs ci are drawn from a uniform
distribution of mean 1 and width 2δ. Agents decide to
maintain a site as habitat based on their costs ci, the mar-
ket price P and the estimated credit value b˜i. They main-
tain a habitat on xi at timestep t if conservation yields a
positive net benefit pi
pii ≡ −ci(t) + P · b˜i(t) > 0. (11)
The credits rewarded to agents are either the marginal in-
centives (eq. 2) given by (1−m) + 2m · β or the additive
incentives (eq. 3) given by (1−m)+m·β. The final benefits
bi rewarded at the end of the round can differ from the es-
timated benefits b˜i because subsequent decisions by other
agents can change the landscape configuration. The accu-
racy of the estimate b˜i depends on the applied behavior
submodel. The three submodels discussed in section 2.2
are implemented in the following way:
Symbol Connotation Range
xi i-th cell on the grid
σi State of the i-th cell {0, 1}
ci(t) Costs of σi = 1 at t [1− δ...1 + δ]
P Market price [1− δ...1 + δ]
δ Cost heterogeneity [0..1]
m Connectivity weight [0..1]
λ Fixed demand [0..1]
Table 2: List of state variables (top) and parameters (bottom).
Null model: All agents decide in parallel according to
eq. 11 without being informed about the decisions of other
agents at this timestep.
Coordination through cheap talk: Agents decide se-
quentially in random order according to eq. 11. After each
decision, all agents are informed about the new config-
uration. This procedure is repeated a number of times,
mimicking the outcome of a non-binding exchange of in-
formation.
Cooperation: Cooperation is modeled by global opti-
mization with full information about credit benefits and
conservation costs. The details of the optimization proce-
dure are described in Appendix Appendix A.
Step by step, the decisions of all agents are collected and
the resulting ecological value U as given in eq. 5 is com-
pared with the demand D (eq. 7). The emergence of an
equilibrium between demand and supply is modeled by
repeatedly adjusting the market price P in eq. 11 until de-
mand and supply are balanced. The order in which agents
are asked is randomized at every timestep, but does not
change while the market price is adjusted. Fig. 2 shows a
flow diagram of the processes within one timestep.
Simulation runs were initialized with a random landscape
configuration which delivered the target supply of conser-
vation. A series of tests showed that the initial config-
uration has no influence on the resulting landscape after
several hundred time steps. This holds true also for non-
random start configurations. Data acquisition was started
after 600 trading steps to ensure that the simulation had
reached its steady state. The results show the mean of 50
runs. Standard deviations for all values were calculated
but omitted in the figures because they were very small.
4. Analytical approximations – clusters and disor-
der
Although the number of landscape configurations which
fulfill the conservation target is extremely large, two struc-
tures are particularly simple and their properties may be
calculated analytically: one is a landscape where habi-
tats are concentrated into one big cluster, the other is a
landscape where habitats are scattered according to the
lowest costs. Examples of these states will appear later
in the results (Fig. 3). Clustering and disorder mark the
5
Figure 2: Flow diagram of processes within one timestep.
extreme cases of possible connectivity values: No other
state produces more connectivity than a cluster, and no
reasonable state (leaving aside anticorrelated structures)
produces less connectivity than the scattered, disordered
state. It will prove useful for the interpretation of the re-
sults to derive some analytical approximations for these
two states.
4.1. Critical δ value for clustering
Let us assume that agents can only choose between
clustering and spread. Clustered structures lead to a higher
credit value per cell, but also to higher average costs, be-
cause a spread, disordered configuration can more effec-
tively allocate conservation efforts on the sites with the
lowest costs. At low values of cost heterogeneity δ com-
pared to connectivity weight m, a clustered structure is
clearly favored. At increasing cost heterogeneity, we ex-
pect a critical value δc where the net benefits from clus-
tering become smaller than the net benefits from spread.
We can derive this critical value by equating the worst
benefit-cost ratio of cells within a cluster with the best ra-
tio of an isolated cell. In a cluster, the habitats with the
highest costs have c = 1 + δ, while outside the cluster, the
cells with lowest costs have c = 1−δ. The ecological value
of a clustered and a disordered cell is given by eqs. 3 and 2.
Hence, we obtain
1
1 + δcadd
=
1−m
1− δcadd
⇒ δcadd = m/(2−m) (12)
1 +m
1 + δcmar
=
1−m
1− δcmar
⇒ δcmar = m (13)
as critical values for additive and marginal incentives, re-
spectively.
4.2. Clustered and disordered cost level
Further, we are also interested in the costs of maintain-
ing the land at either of the two states. Cells in a cluster
have 8 neighbors and therefore yield an average ecological
value of (1 −m) + m · β = 1 per cell (eq. 5). Therefore,
a number of λ ·N patches satisfies the fixed demand of λ
per cell (eq. 7). As costs are spatially uncorrelated, the
mean costs c¯p within a cluster are approximately equal
to the mean costs of the landscape (for the chosen func-
tion c¯p = 1) as long as finite size effects can be neglected.
Thus, the total costs of satisfying the demand of λ · N
credits through a cluster are
Cclu =
1
N
·N · λ = λ . (14)
This means that the costs for a cluster are simply constant
and proportional to its size. In a disordered state of density
α, occupied sites are distributed randomly according to
the lowest costs. Each occupied cell has on average 8 · α
neighbors, leading to an average credit value of (1−m) +
m · α per grid cell. To reach an average credit supply of λ
per cell, we require that
α [(1−m) +m · α] = λ . (15)
Solving for α yields
α =
−1 +m+
√
(−1 +m)2 + 4mλ
2m
. (16)
When the cells with the lowest costs are selected first, the
marginal costs cp(ζ) increase with the fraction ζ of cells
which are selected. With costs being uniformly distributed
across the interval [1− δ . . . 1 + δ], cp(ζ) is given by
cp(ζ) = (1− δ) + 2δ · ζ . (17)
From this, we can derive the total costs for a disordered
state as
Cdo = α
∫ α
0
cp(ζ)dζ = α− (α− α2) · δ . (18)
Thus, the costs for a disordered state are dependent on
the cost heterogeneity δ and are linearly decreasing with
δ. The cost lines for the clustered and the disordered state
mark an upper boundary for cost-effective configurations
in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6. As a function of δ, they intersect at
δ =
α− λ
α− α2 = m (19)
where the second equality is derived from inserting the
expression in eq. 16 for α. Note that the final result, δ =
m, coincides with the critical point for marginal incentives
(eq. 13).
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Figure 3: On the left, landscape connectivity K (eq. 9)for marginal incentives (top), additive incentives (middle) and cooperation (bottom)
as a function of cost heterogeneity δ and connectivity weight m at λ = 0.1. Darker colors indicate lower connectivity. Dotted lines display
the theoretical curves as given in eqs. 12 and 13. The right graph shows a cross-section of the three plots in δ direction at m = 0.5 together
with typical landscape structures emerging from the simulations in the three domains: Clusters (left), transition states (middle) and disorder
(right). The two arrows indicate the transition state appears at different levels of δ, depending on the chosen incentive mechanism.
5. Simulation results
5.1. Critical values
When analyzing the parameter space of m and δ, we
observe steep transitions of all aggregated state variables
along a curve of critical value pairs (δc,mc). Parame-
ter values beyond this curve lead to disordered landscape
structures, while values below δc lead to ordered, con-
nected structures. The shape of the transition curve in
the space of m and δ differs for additive and marginal in-
centives. Fig. 3 shows the simulation results for additive
and marginal incentives at λ = 0.1 together with the an-
alytically derived curves eqs. 12 and 13. The right side of
Fig. 3 shows a vertical cross-section of the left hand side
plots in δ-direction at m = 0.5. The transition values δc in
this curve agree with the analytical approximations from
eqs. 12 and 13 (Table 3).
Model Simulation Approximation
Additive Incentives 0.33± 0.02 0.33
Marginal Incentives 0.50± 0.02 0.5
Table 3: Critical value δc (measured as δ at half transition) at m =
0.5 from Fig. 3 together with theoretical expectations
The introduction of coordination (submodel b.1 and b.2)
leaves these results largely unchanged. Fig. 4 shows that
coordination only slightly decreases the steepness of the
transition, but does not change the transition point. In
contrast to that, cooperative decisions lead to a rather
broad, nearly linear transition for the same parameter val-
ues.
5.2. Cost-effectiveness
A second question was how the three behavior options
would perform in terms of costs needed to reach an equal
amount of conservation credits. Fig. 5 shows the total
conservation costs as a function of cost heterogeneity δ at
m = 0.5, together with the theoretical cost levels for the
clustered and the disordered states as calculated in eqs. 14
and 18 (dotted lines). Noticeably, the cost function of
additive incentives displays a hump around the transition
area (Fig. 5), leading to approximately 20% higher costs
for additive compared to marginal incentives. Considering
the theoretical cost functions for the ordered and the dis-
ordered states (eqs. 14, 18), the reason becomes evident:
Under marginal incentives, agents switch from clustering
to disorder right at the point where the costs of a clus-
ter and the costs of a disordered state intersect (eq. 19).
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does not affect the critical point δc of the additive incentive curves.
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Figure 5: Total conservation costs as a function of cost heterogeneity
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for the clustered and the disordered state (dashed lines).
In contrast, under additive incentives, agents switch to
disordered configurations earlier at a lower level of cost
heterogeneity δ. At this point, the cost level of a disor-
dered configuration is still considerably higher than that
of a clustered one, resulting in efficiency losses in this area.
5.3. Influence of behavior on costs
The inefficiency which has been observed for additive
incentives is to a great extent mitigated by the introduc-
tion of coordination (Fig. 6). For a value of 10 communi-
cation steps per trading period, only small differences be-
tween additive and marginal incentives remain. This stems
mainly from a better adaptation of land use to the cur-
rent costs. Transition points and thus the landscape struc-
ture remain largely unchanged by coordination as shown
in Fig. 4.
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Figure 6: Effect of coordination: Plottet are the total conservation
costs as a function of cost heterogeneity δ at m = 0.5 and λ = 0.1.
With increasing coordination steps, the costs of additive incentives
approach the costs of marginal incentives.
The total conservation costs under cooperation are con-
siderably lower than for the other options (Fig. 5). They
differ mostly around the critical values δc, where optimal
decisions are more difficult to obtain than for extreme val-
ues of δ where one allocation pattern (cluster or disorder)
is clearly favored.
6. Discussion
6.1. Main findings
The aim of this modeling study was to examine the ef-
fect of simple spatial incentives and social organization
on the emerging landscape structures and on the total
cost of a conservation market. We introduced an agent-
based model of a conservation market with spatial incen-
tives. The model enabled us to compare different spatial
incentives (additive and marginal) and different types of
agent behavior, including individual and collective decision
processes. By individual decisions, we mean that agents
decide individually according to their costs and benefits,
while collective decisions consider the costs and benefits of
the whole group.
Our results show that rewarding more conservation cred-
its when other conservation sites were directly connected
to the focal site could effectively the larger scale struc-
ture of conservation measures. The connectivity weight
m, which determines the amount of credits which are re-
warded for conservation, acts as a control parameter that
determines the clustering of habitats in the landscape. The
exact shape of this response depends on the heterogeneity
of conservation costs, the incentive mechanism, and the
assumed behavior of agents (Fig. 3).
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Individual decision processes with low information (null
model a.1,a.2) lead to a partitioning of the parameter space,
each producing very distinct landscape patterns, separated
by a small transition area. These predominant patterns are
a completely clustered state, appearing when cost hetero-
geneity δ is low compared to the connectivity weight m,
and a completely disordered state, emerging when δ is high
compared to m. The reason for the stability of these two
states in a dynamical and heterogeneous cost background
lies in the fact that, starting from one of them, agents
repeatedly end up in a very similar configuration, since
trading stops as soon as a local cost optimum is found.
Decision processes with more information (coordination
b.1,b.2) explore a wider range of options, but even in the
case of coordination with a large number of communica-
tion steps, agents stop trading once trade cannot improve
the position of any single agent (Fig. 4). Only cooperating
agents (submodel c) completely avoid getting stuck in lo-
cal suboptima and produce a more linear response to the
control parameter m (Fig. 3).
The total costs expected to reach the same amount of con-
servation credits are significantly different between marginal
and additive incentives in markets with low information,
particularly in the transition regime (Fig. 5). This strong
cost increase originates from the too early abandonment
of clusters under additive incentives. At increased lev-
els of coordination, the cost differences between additive
and marginal incentives are considerably reduced (Fig. 6).
The most efficient allocation of conserved sites is achieved
through collective decisions (cooperation), where the con-
figuration space is explored in a way which avoids get-
ting stuck in local minima (Fig. 5) and differences between
marginal and additive incentives disappear.
6.2. Assumptions and generality of the results
A prerequisite for the difference between marginal and
additive incentives is that the ecosystem changes created
by the market are not marginal. If changes were marginal,
such that all interactions between sites are approximately
unchanged by the actions induced by the market, one may
simply use the marginal value as a basis for the evaluation,
also in the case of fixed price payments schemes. For most
real-world situations, however, it is likely that actions in-
duced by the market interact. In such cases, it may be
beneficial to implement incentives that explicitly include
interactions between sites.
For such cases, we view the model presented in this pa-
per as a generic model for the supply side of a spatial
conservation market. The reader may have noted that
we have fixed the supply, i.e. the amount of credits pro-
duced at each time step (eq.7). One might suggest that the
model should therefore be rather interpreted as the special
case of a tradable permit market or an auction, where the
amount of credits is fixed and prices vary. However, we
could equally have fixed the costs of conservation, as was
done with the same model in (Hartig and Drechsler, 2009).
Within the model assumptions, both options (fixing prices
or quantities) are equivalent, because fixed prices result in
a fixed amount of credits and vice versa. We therefore
think that the model is generic for the way spatial incen-
tives act on the spatial allocation of conservation measures
and does not make any assumptions which would require
that it be interpreted as a specific market form such as an
auction, a payment scheme, or a permit market.
One assumption made in the model is that conservation
costs are uncorrelated in time, as implied by the ran-
dom sampling of costs from the uniform distribution at
each step of the simulation process. While strong yearly
changes of costs may occur in some situations, e.g. when
farmers are using land that needs to rest for conserva-
tion, totally uncorrelated costs are, in general, rather un-
likely. The results, however, qualitatively prevail in the
case of cost correlations. Although not presented, we ap-
plied an unsystematic analysis of temporal and spatio-
temporal correlation of costs as they were used in (Hartig
and Drechsler, 2009). Temporal correlation of costs acts
similarly to increasing coordination steps in our model.
This can be understood when considering that increasing
coordination is essentially a temporal correlation of costs,
as costs are fixed during the time of communication. Ad-
ditional spatial cost correlation further decreases the ef-
ficiency losses associated with individual decisions. We
assume that the reason for this is the spatial smoothing of
the costs. When the cost correlation length is large com-
pared to the correlation of the incentives, the chances of
getting stuck in a local minimum decrease rapidly.
There are a number of abstractions from reality regarding
the behavior of agents. First of all, for all three behav-
ior models, we assumed that there are no additional costs
associated with decisions and information exchange. Sec-
ondly, we assumed that agents are fair. In reality, both
coordination through cheap talk and cooperation present
possibilities to strategically exploit other agents. Cheap
talk includes the possibility of strategic lies. Agents may
try to induce their neighbors to make the first move to-
wards conservation so that they themselves can subse-
quently free-ride. Cooperation requires landowners to re-
veal their true costs and temporarily accept lower payoffs
if, in exchange, the group payoff is increased. Payments
between landowners (side payments) could compensate for
these losses, but the question of how this kind of cooper-
ative system should be organized and whether it is stable
against exploitation by defectors and free-riders remains
open. One could, however, hope that stabilizing mech-
anisms such as reputation (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Sig-
mund et al., 2001; Milinski et al., 2002) may improve coop-
eration at least when defection is observable for neighbors.
However, if defection is only detectable indirectly, support
for persistent cooperation would be much weaker. Experi-
mental studies as proposed in Hartig et al. (in press) could
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help to study which of these strategies are most likely to
be realized by human agents.
Finally, very important for real-world conservation are restora-
tion costs and time lags for restoration. In this model,
we assumed that land use can be changed instantaneously
and without costs. The inclusion of costs and the time
lags associated with habitat restoration appears to be an
interesting problem for future research.
6.3. Policy implications
Market-based instruments are increasingly applied for
biodiversity conservation on private lands. At present,
conservation markets seldom include spatial interactions
between sites. One reason for this is that the inclusion
of interactions increases transaction costs, i.e. costs as-
sociated with organizing the trading (Salzman, 2005; Jack
et al., 2008). On the other hand, even simple spatial incen-
tives may provide considerable efficiency gains for main-
taining biodiversity by means of market-based instruments
(Hartig and Drechsler, 2009). Our results suggest that it
is possible to control larger scale landscape structures with
relatively simple spatial incentives. We tested two differ-
ent spatial incentive mechanisms. Marginal incentives are
dependent on the order of trading and therefore rather
qualify for markets where trading takes place sequentially
and the contract length is long, such as, for example, in
tradable permit markets. Additive incentives are slightly
simpler and qualify better for schemes where transactions
are performed in parallel and the contract length is short,
such as yearly payments. In the case of perfectly cooper-
ating landowners, both options yield the same result. If
landowners decide individually, however, marginal incen-
tives generally perform better than additive incentives.
Therefore, the two main messages for policy are: 1) The re-
action of landowners to spatial incentives is likely to differ
with social organization and the applied incentive mecha-
nism. 2) Besides changing the incentives, a market design
that encourages cooperation seems beneficial when apply-
ing spatial metrics in market-based instruments.
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Appendix A. Optimimzation
To model a perfectly rational cooperating group of
agents, we performed a global optimization of the land
Parameter Connotation Value
T0 Start temperature 3
τ Decay parameter 0.001
n Steps 3500
ν Fraction of sites 0.5
Table A.4: Optimization parameters chosen for the simulated an-
nealing
configuration. We used a slightly modified simulated an-
nealing algorithm, which delivered better results than the
original algorithm by Kirkpatrick et al. (1983). The goal
of the optimization was to minimize the total conservation
costs as defined in eq. 10 under the constraint of satisfying
the fixed demand as given in eq. 7:
min
{
n∑
i=1
σi · ci(t)
}
U=λ·N
. (A.1)
A random site xi was occupied with probability
p(σi, T ) = min
(
1, e−
φi(σi)−Φ
T
)
(A.2)
where φi(σi) is the marginal benefit-cost ratio of site xi
and Φ is the average benefit-cost ratio of the present con-
figuration. The simulated annealing was performed in n
steps with a new random subset of N ·ν of the sites at each
step. To satisfy the constraints, each step was followed by
adding (removing) conserved sites starting with the sites
of highest (lowest) φ until the target value of U = λ · N
was met. Temperature decay was exponential with decay
parameter τ per time step. Table A.4 lists the parameter
values used.
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